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ABSTRACT
This article explores law's protagonism and effects in contemporary
conflicts over development, natural resource extraction, and indigenous
peoples' rights. It focuses on the sociolegal site where these conflicts have
been most visible and acute: consultations with indigenous peoples prior
to the undertaking of economic projects that affect them.
I argue that legal disputes over prior consultation are part of a
broader process of juridification of ethnic claims, which I call
"ethnicity.gov."I examine the plurality of public and private regulations
involved in this process and trace their affinity with the procedural logic
of neoliberal global governance. I further argue that ethnicity.gov is a
highly contested field, as shown by the legal strategies and regulatory
frameworks on consultation, which the global indigenous rights
-movement has advanced in opposition to neoliberalism.
Drawing on empirical research in Colombia and other Latin
American countries, I study consultation in action and document its
ambiguous effects on indigenouspeoples' rights.
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INTRODUCTION

A. Law in the Minefields of Global Capitalism
As I watch the PowerPoint slides pass from one to the next, I forget
for a moment that we are in one of the most violent corners of the world.
The person speaking is a leader of the Embera-Katio, an indigenous
people from northern Colombia, who tells us of a succession of tragedies
that now threaten to render his people extinct. "The State and the
multinational companies seek to exploit natural resources in indigenous
territories," he says, as a map of Colombia's indigenous reservations
flickers on the run-down school's only blackboard. "And what we
Embera have is water." With a click, the map of the Urri dam appears.
The dam was constructed in the early 1990s, against the indigenous
people's will, amid the jungle's web of rivers that brought us to this
place. "Before Urri, the Embera people lived off of fishing and hunting,
but now, with our territory flooded and the rivers' courses altered, we
have to travel three hours by motorboat to the closest town to buy
sources of protein. And we can't hunt because the guerrillas covered the
mountain with landmines."
The guerrillas he refers to are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the oldest guerilla group in the world. They prowl the
reservation and terrorize the Embera while they fight with the
Colombian army over territory and compete with right-wing,
paramilitary groups over narcotrafficking business. The paramilitary
groups have also been sowing death and destruction in the region for
the past fifteen years. In fact, we are only five hours (three by boat and
two by car) from Tierralta, one of the paramilitary world capitals, in the
C6rdoba province. Since the late 1980s, Tierralta has served as the
headquarters for the counteroffensive that was launched by landowners,
narcotraffickers, politicians, and sectors of the army to drive out the
guerillas and gain control of the fertile land, water, minerals, and coca
crops. To achieve this goal, they deemed it necessary to forcefully
displace over 30,000 people from Tierralta,' perpetrate twenty-two

1. See Diagn6stico Departamental de C6rdoba, Observatorio del Programa
Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, n.d. 4
[Diagnosis of the Department of Cdrdoba, Observation from the PresidentialProgram of
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Rights] (Colom.) (discussing human

rights violations stemming from armed conflict involving left-wing guerilla groups (FARC
and ELN), right-wing paramilitaries (AUC), drug-trafficking gangs, and the Colombian
military).
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massacres in C6rdoba, 2 and kill hundreds of people. Among those killed
were at least nine indigenous leaders who opposed the Urri dam, 3
which represented the type of economic development that was
vigorously supported by the paramilitaries.4 Thus, with the next click,
the face of Kimy Pernia appears. In 2001, paramilitaries assassinated
Pernia, the leader of the Embera resistance against the dam.5
The PowerPoint slides then take an unexpected turn. The maps and
photographs are followed by a list that discusses a cascade of norms and
judicial decisions-the International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Convention 169, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and the precautionary measures ordered by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to prevent the
annihilation of the Embera people after Pernia's assassination.
Click. An even longer list appears, recounting the Colombian
Constitutional Court's decisions against the government for its failure
to consult indigenous leaders before initiating economic projects within
their territories, notwithstanding Colombia's ratification of ILO
Convention 169, which imposes this obligation.
Thereafter, the phrase repeated in the presentation is "prior
consultation." Its effect is magnified because it is one of the few Spanish
terms-along with others, such as Corte Constitucional(Constitutional
Court), sentencia (ruling), and gobierno (government)-that sprinkle the
remarks of participants who only speak Embera. At this point, it is clear
that the talk has turned into a legal memorandum. The speaker, a
leader who has braved death sentences from the paramilitaries and the
guerillas for nearly a decade to defend his people, stumbles uncertainly
into the terrain of legal procedure: how to prove the dam has caused
harm to Embera communities; which court to bring a new case before in
2. Id.; see also Eder Maylor Caicedo Fraide, El Plan C6rdoba [The C6rdoba Plan],
VERDADABIERTA.COM (Feb. 4, 2009, 03:37 PM), http://www. verdadabierta. com/
parapolitica /cordoba/851-el-plan-cordoba (explaining how paramilitaries have infiltrated
C6rdoba's state agencies and politics).
3. Comisi6n Colombiana de Juristas, Boletin No. 22: Serie sobre los derechos de las
victimas y la aplicacidn de la ley 975, Urrd II, una amenaza mortal para el pueblo
indigena Embera-Katio del alto Sind 2 [Commission of Colombian Lawyers, Bulletin No.
22: Series on Victims' Rights and the Application of the 975 Law, Urrd H, Deadly Threat
for the Indigenous Embera-Katioof Sindi, Bulletin] (Jan. 8, 2008).
4. See also Resoluci6n Defensorial No. 013, Sobre La Violaci6n de los Derechos
Humanos de la Comunidad Indigena Embera-Katio del Alto Sin [Defensory Resolution
No. 013, On the Human Rights Violations of the Indigenous Embera-Katio of Sindi, (June
19, 2001) (Colom.) (explaining the trajectory of the Embera's plight, and the ombudsman's
role in the process).
5. Kimy Pernia, lider indigena embera asesinado [Kimy Pernia, Embera Leader
Assassinated],VERDADABIERTA.COM (Jan. 6, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.verdadabierta.com/
nunca-mas/asesinatos/periodistas/1898-kimy-pernia-lider-indigena-embera-asesinado.
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order to suspend the government and the company's plans to enlarge
the dam; what is the status of the last legal action presented by the
nongovernmental organization (NGO) that represents them; who is the
indigenous people's legal representative in the approaching prior
consultation procedure; how to make use during these ensuing
procedures of the Constitutional Court's judgment6 and the report by
the ILO committee,7 which both condemned the Colombian government
for authorizing the construction of the Urri dam without consulting the
Embera.
These legal artifacts-the succession of procedural deadlines, the
architecture of laws and decisions, the affirmation of equality between
parties to a case-are precisely what generate the illusion of order, and
in turn, make us forget for a moment that we are in the heart of the
chaos. Thereafter, we get stuck in a long discussion about prior
consultation's technicalities, as if death squads were not patrolling just
a few kilometers away, as if the territory were not littered with
landmines, as if all of the few families in attendance did not have some
member who had been assassinated or forcibly displaced, as if we had
not crossed paths along the river with speedboats that were driven by
fully armed soldiers, who play cat and mouse with the settlers that
transport coca downriver.
How is this coexistence of order and chaos (this coexistence of the
utmost legal formalism and the most extreme violence) possible? At
what point did indigenous peoples' resistance to cultural and physical
annihilation turn into a discussion of legal procedure? This article is an
attempt at answering these questions and explaining law's protagonism,
effects, and paradoxes in cases such as Urri, arising from the "socioenvironmental conflicts" that characterize global capitalism at the turn
of the century.8 Indeed, as the globalization of both extractive capitalism
and indigenous rights has intensified over the last two decades, conflicts
over the exploitation of indigenous lands have multiplied and escalated
apace across the world. Such disputes involve myriad national and
international actors (e.g., national states, transnational corporations
6. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 1998,
Sentencia T-652/98 (Colom.).
7. Comm'n of Inquiry, ILO, Fourth Supplementary Report: Representation Alleging
Non-observance by Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No.
169), made under' article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Central Unitary Workers'
Union (CUT) and the Colombian Medical Trade Union Association (Asmedas), ILO Doc.
GB.282/14/4 (Nov. 2001).
8. See MARISTELIA SVAMPA, CAMBIO DE EPOCA: MOVIMIENTOS SOCLALES Y PODER
POLITICO [CHANGE OF EPOcH: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL POWER] 104-12 (2009)

(analyzing the transformation of social movements in Latin America and the rise of new
structural conflicts revolving around the ownership and exploitation of natural resources).
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(TNCs), NGOs, grassroots movements, and transnational regulatory
and financial agencies) and condense into a particularly revealing and
volatile mix of some of the key legal, political, and economic processes
underlying globalization.
As David Harvey has shown in his analysis of contemporary
capitalism,9 the renewed economic importance of export-oriented,
extractive industries, driven by China's demand for raw materials, has
generated transnational competition for natural resources and,
therefore, has renewed interest in the exploration of frontier territories.
These lands are precisely where indigenous peoples, displaced from
their ancestral territories, have settled historically and where the most
intense conflicts about free, prior, and informed consultation (FPIC)
have taken place. Thus, in terms of political economy, the explosion of
these socio-environmental conflicts occurs in the context of a brand of
capitalism that is marked by "accumulation by dispossession,"' 0
including the dispossession of indigenous peoples and communities who
have been traditional inhabitants of territories presently coveted by all
-from states and TNCs to mafias and illegal armed groups, who each
want a share of the bounty of gold, coal, oil, coltan, diamonds, water,
and other natural resources.
In the following discussion, I use the term "minefields" to refer to
these territories and the dynamics of social interactions produced within
them, including FPIC processes. They are minefields in both the
sociological and the economic sense. In sociological terms, they are true
social fields," characterized by the features of enclave, extractive
economies, which include grossly unequal power relations between
companies and communities, and a limited state presence. They are
minefields because they are highly risky; within this terrain, social
relations are fraught with violence, suspicion dominates, and any false
step can bring lethal consequences. In this regard, they are an
indication of the volatile social relations that are associated with hybrid
economies-situated at the crossroads of legality, illegality, and
informality-which abound in nations of the Global South (and
2
increasingly in the Global North) in times of globalization.'

9. DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2003).
10. Id. at 137-82.
11. For the classical formulation of the theory of social fields, see
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge
(1972).
12. See John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law and Disorder in
Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1, at 29-31
John L. Comaroff eds., 2006).

PIERRE BOURDIEU,
Univ. Press 1977)
the Postcolony: An
(Jean Comaroff &
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I call them minefields because they are also frequently minefields in
the economic sense. In many cases, they revolve around a mine's
exploitation of some valuable resource. In other cases, like Urrai and
several other conflicts I have observed in Colombia, they are also
minefields in the most literal sense of the word: the indigenous
territories in dispute are plagued by antipersonnel mines that are
planted by illegal, armed groups as a strategy of war and for obtaining
territorial control. The two types of mines, therefore, are the most
visible face of the social field's risk, the incorporeal vertigo that we could
sense that night in the Colombian jungle of the Embera's territory.
B. PriorConsultationof Indigenous Peoples: The Article's Argument
and Organization
In this article, I analyze the sociolegal site where one can most
clearly observe the role of law in minefields: processes of consulting
indigenous peoples prior to carrying out economic projects or adopting
laws or policies that directly affect them. The idea of prior consultation
is relatively new in international law, arising from the aforementioned
ILO Convention 169 of 1989. Despite its youth, however, it has
precipitated a true explosion of hard and soft law norms at both the
international and national levels, which incorporate different versions of
indigenous peoples' right to FPIC. In fact, I argue in this article that
FPIC's rise and impact on regulations and disputes about indigenous
rights have been so profound that instead of merely constituting a legal
figure, it entails a new approach to ethnic rights and multiculturalism,
with its own language and rules. Thus, the consultation approach has
become the most likely candidate for replacing the integrationist
approach, which prevailed in international law and domestic legal
frameworks throughout the twentieth century and purported to resolve
the "indigenous problem" by assimilating aboriginal peoples into the
rest of society.13 In this sense, it is no coincidence that Convention 169
originated from the ILO's decision to revise the emblematic legal
framework of assimilation (i.e., ILO Convention 107, which went into
effect in 1959), "to shift the Convention's emphasis from the objectives of
integration to that of respect for identity of [indigenous] populations and
to promote increased consultation with, and participation by, these
peoples in the decisions affecting them." 14

13. See Luis RODRiGUEZ-PlfERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME 299 (2005).
14. ILO, PROGRAM AND BUDGET OF THE BIENNIUM 1986/1987: 60TH FINANCIAL PERIOD
150.16 (1985).
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A brief look at some of the most recent regulatory instruments
inspired by this approach is enough to appreciate its diversity, dizzying
growth, and tensions, as well as its high stakes. While the World Bank
issued Operational Policy 4.10 (O.P. 4.10) in 2004 (which requires
governments to consult with indigenous peoples as a prerequisite for
receiving loans for projects that affect them), a Working Group that was
established by the then U.N. Commission on Human Rights made the
final revisions to the FPIC-related provisions of the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which at long last was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 2007, after twelve years of intense debate
and negotiations regarding, principally, the controversial subject of
consultation)."
In another telling coincidence, while the International Council on
Mining and Metals (ICMM), the largest global mining industry
association, adopted a set of principles to govern relations between
companies and indigenous peoples, which included the need to "ensure a
fair and open process of consultation," 6 the ILO undertook an
assessment of twenty years of Convention 169's implementation and
launched a new edition of its application manual for the convention." In
2010, Oxfam published a multilingual practice guide to orient
indigenous communities in exercising a more demanding right to free,
prior, and informed consent (FPIConsent).1 In the same year, the
International Finance Corporation (i.e., the World Bank Group's entity
that grants loans to the private sector) revised its Policy on Social and
Environmental Sustainability to consider whether, instead of requiring
consultation of affected indigenous peoples, borrowers should be
required to obtain their consent. 9
How can the overlap between such diverse actors around the subject
of prior consultation be explained? What type of legality will result from
the hybridization of these legal regimes? What lies behind this explosion
15. For a detailed account of this plural legal field, see Lillian Aponte Miranda, The
Hybrid State-CorporateEnterprise and Violations of lndigenous Land Rights: Theorizing
CorporateResponsibility and Accountability Under InternationalLaw, 11 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 135 (2007).
16. Position Statement, ICMM, Mining and Indigenous Peoples (May 2008). This
document is part of ICMM's Sustainable Development Framework, the association's code of
conduct. For additional information about the Framework, see generally Sustainable
Development Framework, ICMM, http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-developmentframework.
17. ILO, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO
CONVENTION No. 169, at 5 (2009).
18. OXFAM, GUIDE TO FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT (2010).
19. Int'l Financial Corp., Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability (2010),
available at httpi/www.fias.net/ifcext/policyreview.nsflAttachmentsByTitleJPhase2-SustPolicy
.Englishclean/$FILE/CODEProgress+ReportAnnexB_SustainabilityPolicyClean.pdf.
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of legal standards regarding the procedure of FPIC and, more recently,
FPIConsent? What impact has this phenomenon had on indigenous
peoples? What does all of this tell us about the future of conflicts over
land, resources, and ethnicity in times of globalization?
In what follows, I address these questions by using empirical
evidence from Latin America, the region where social and legal conflicts
concerning FPIC have been most visible and acute. As I write this
article, the most hotly contested political debate in Peru pertains to the
law before Congress regulating the right to consultation.20 The
discussion is actually just the most recent episode of the deepest social
conflict in Peru, which exploded in 2009 with the Amazonian indigenous
peoples' mobilization against the commercial exploitation of their
ancestral territories and reached such proportions that it led to a public
faceoff between the Peruvian President and the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples. 21 At the same time, in Ecuador, the
Constitutional Court handed down one of the most polemic judgments of
its short history, regarding a case brought by the Confederation of
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador against the 2009 mining law for
lack of consultation.22 As in Peru, the Ecuadorian case is part of a more
structural dispute over natural resources, the environment, and ethnic
rights, which had generated profound divisions within the 2008

20. Javier la Rosa Calle, El derecho a la consulta previa de los pueblos indigenas en el
Perd: dificultades para su implementaci6n [Indigenous Peoples' Right to Prior
Consultationin Peru: Implementation Challenges], 14 APORTESDPFL 14 (Sept. 2010).
21. See Informe del Relator Especial sobre la situaci6n de los derechos humanos y las
libertades fundamentales de los indigenas: Observaciones sobre la situaci6n de los pueblos
indigenas de la Amazonia y los sucesos del 5 de junio y dias posteriores en las provincias
de Bagua y Utcubamba, Peri [Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People:
Observationson the Situation of the Amazonian Indigenous People and the Events of June
5 and After in the Provinces of Bagua and Utcubamba, Perd], U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/34/Add.8, United Nations, Hum. Rts. Council, (Aug. 18, 2009) (by S. James
Anaya); see also Declaraci6n piblica del Relator Especial sobre los derechos humanos y
libertades fundamentales de los indigenas, sobre la "Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a
los pueblos indigenas u originarios reconocido en el Convenio No. 169 de la Organizaci6n
Internacional de Trabajo" aprobada por el Congreso de la Republica del Peru [Special
Rapporteur, Public Declaration of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and
Liberties of the Indigenous, Over the "Legislative Bill on the Indigenous Peoples' Right to
Prior Consultation as Stipulated in ILO Convention 169" approved by the Peruvian
Congress], United Nations, Hum. Rts. Council, (July 7, 2010) (by S. James Anaya),
available at http/www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEventsPages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=l0194
&LangIDS.
22. Corte Constitucional [C.C.], marzo 18, 2010, Sentencia 001-10-SIN-CC (Ecuador).
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Constituent Assembly.23 Meanwhile, in Chile, the government and the
indigenous movement are locked in a fight over the legal intricacies of
implementing Convention 169, which became effective in Chile in
2009.24 Simultaneously, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights ordered Guatemala to suspend exploitation of a gold mine that it
had granted to a multinational firm, Goldcorp, as a provisional measure
in a case alleging violation of FPIC.25 Meanwhile, the Colombian
Constitutional Court, which for the past two decades has been
developing the region's richest jurisprudence on FPIC, issued a ruling
that halted Muriel Mining's exploitation of a major copper deposit, 26
citing Inter-American Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence, which
imposes the stricter FPIConsent requirement for cases in which projects
or measures being consulted have an impact on the very survival of the
affected indigenous group. 27
We are, thus, before a sociolegal field of regional scale-highly
disputed and still in formation-which allows us to witness processes
with global repercussions in vivid detail. In the following pages, I
analytically and empirically unpack this field, drawing on evidence
obtained using a combination of techniques-such as qualitative
research, including eighty-eight semi-structured interviews with key
actors in consultation processes (e.g., indigenous leaders, state officials,
human rights lawyers, experts in corporate social responsibility,
environmentalists, officials or ex-officials of the United Nations,
academics specializing in environmental or ethnic studies, and advisors
to companies). Likewise, I draw on participatory observation of
meetings of grassroots and human rights organizations, indigenous
leaders, and state officials. Although the information was gathered
primarily in Colombia and the case study referred to throughout the
text is on Urrd, 28 my research also included interviews and
23. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, REFUNDACI6N DEL ESTADO EN AMARICA LATINA:
PERSPECTIVAS DESDE UNA EPISTEMOLOGIA DEL SUR [REFOUNDING THE STATE IN LATIN
AMERICA: EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOUTHJ 116-19 (2010).

24. Jorge Contesse, Consulta y pueblos indigenas: el caso de Chile [Consultation and
Indigenous Peoples: The Case of Chile], 14 APORTEsDPFL 32 (Sept. 2010).
25. Cmtys. of the Maya People (Sipakepense & Mam) of the Sipacapa & San Miguel
Ixtahuacdn Muns. in the Dep't of San Marcos, Guatemala, Precautionary Measures, Order
of the Comm'n, No. PM 260-07 (May 20, 2010). For a summary of the measure, see
Precautionary Measures Granted by the Commission in 2010, INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.cidh.org/medidas/2010.eng.htm (scroll down
to "PM 260-07').
26. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.], octubre 2, 2009, Sentencia T-769/09.
27. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, 1 133-37 (Nov. 28, 2007).
28. For an in-depth study of the UrrA case, see CASAR RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITO &
NATALIA ORDUZ, DESARROLLO, DERECHOS INDIGENAS Y CONSULTA PREVIA: EL CASO DE LA
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ethnographic work in Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and other locations
(principally Washington, D.C.), where regional activism and norms
about the subject are generated. Lastly, in terms of documented sources,
I draw upon an analysis of the key judicial decisions and laws on
consultation in the aforementioned countries, as well as an examination
of the genesis and application of FPIC in international law.29
With this analytical focus and information in mind, I develop three
sets of arguments, which correspond with this article's three sections. In
the first section, I sketch a conceptual framework that situates conflicts
and law on consultation within a wider sociolegal process: the
regulation of ethnicity in times of globalization, which I call
"ethnicity.gov." Using this concept, I try to shed light on the
juridification of ethnic claims and demands, which include extremely
diverse regulations, from those produced by nation-states (e.g., treaties,
laws, and judicial decisions on collective rights) to norms created by the
private sector (e.g., companies' codes of conduct that regulate their
relations with indigenous groups) and by social movements' legal battles
(e.g., human rights litigation in international and national courts). I
trace the origins of this plural legality and maintain that the point of
convergence for its varied components is the emphasis in procedural
aspects and in deliberations among actors in regulatory conflicts,
including indigenous peoples. I argue that this emphasis reflects a
broader trend: the prevalence of the neoliberal "governance paradigm," 30
which explains the proliferation of terms such as "participation,"
"empowerment," and "consultation" of "stakeholders" in all types of
regulations. I then show that ethnicity.gov is a controversial process to
the extent that the global movement in support of indigenous rights has
contested the governance paradigm for the past three decades. By
vindicating the principle of indigenous peoples' self-determination, this
movement has influenced international and national rules on collective
rights.
REPRESA DE URRA EN COLOMBIA [DEVELOPMENT, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, AND PRIOR
CONSULATION: THE CASE OF URRA DAM IN COLOMBIA] (forthcoming 2011).

29. The results of these studies on international rights are found in CASAR RODRIGUEZGARAVITO ET AL., LA CONSULTA PREVIA A LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS: LOS ESTANDARES DEL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL [INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHT TO PRIOR CONSULTATION: THE
STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] (2010), and C9SAR RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITo & YUKYAN
LAM, ENTRE LA CONSULTA Y EL CONSENTIMIENTO: EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL SOBRE LA
PARTICIPACION DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS [BETWEEN CONSULTATION AND CONSENT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE] (forthcoming 2011).

30. See generally Bob Jessop, The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The
Case of Economic Development, 155 INT'L Soc. SCI. J. 29, 29 (1998) (discussing "whether
the rise of the governance paradigm might also reflect fundamental shifts in economic,
political and social life").
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Against this backdrop, I devote the remainder of the article to FPIC,
the most vivid and complete illustration of the features, political
tensions, actors, interests, and legalities at play in ethnicity.gov. In the
second section, I examine the regulation of FPIC within international
law and its incorporation into national legal regimes, especially in Latin
America. I show how FPIC-from its genesis in the ILO debates during
Convention 169's drafting-has exemplified a tradeoff between different
legalities and visions of multiculturalism, which can be so different as
those defended by the global indigenous movement, on the one hand,
and those put forth by TNCs in the extractive industry, on the other. I
also assert that this tradeoff has been made possible precisely because
of the focus on consultation procedure and the bracketing of significant
conflicts over land, resources, and self-determination. In this regard, I
argue that FPIC's global diffusion (and attraction for such different
actors) is due to the fact that, in concentrating on procedural aspects
(such as meetings' durations and certifications of the affected
communities' representatives), it offers a lingua franca that allows for
contacts between radically different conceptions of development, nature,
and human flourishing. In other words, law's intrinsic procedural
nature-exacerbated by the governance paradigm's neoliberal
multiculturalism-at the very least permits provisional communication
between them.
The key word, however, is "provisional." For I also argue that the
emphasis on procedure postpones or mitigates, but does not eliminate,
substantive disagreements, nor contrasting visions of participation and
empowerment defended by the governance crowd and the indigenous
rights movement. Although FPIC comprises points of convergence
among very different regulations and actors, it is also plagued by
chronic tensions that resurface at each procedural step along the way.
As we will see, the most telling example of the resurgence of substance
over form is the current debate over whether international law requires
only consultation or also requires obtaining the indigenous peoples'
consent-a debate that, in fact, nearly frustrated the negotiations on the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Before drawing some brief conclusions, in the third section, I switch
from the regulation of FPIC to an examination of its operation. In
practice, how do consultations work? What effects do they have?
Ethnographic evidence confirms the replacement of substantive
discussions by procedural talk. Debates on factors such as timelines,
affidavits, and attendees' legal standing tend to take the place of
discussions on ethnic rights, land, and natural resources. However, such
replacement is partial and temporary because substantive conflicts
resurface at every turn in the course of consultations, even if under the
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guise of procedural disagreements. I show that the pervasive
recurrent
and substance
produces
entanglement
of form
misunderstandings and missteps during negotiations among
corporations, governments, and indigenous peoples.
Further, I show that FPIC's impact on indigenous peoples is also
ambiguous. On the one hand, the juridification of indigenous claims and
demands through FPIC has converted at least part of the movement's
political energy into legal discussions that favor procedure and has
transferred part of the responsibility for initiating and controlling these
claims to external legal advisors. FPIC thus dilutes and displaces
collective demands and turns them, at least partially, into procedural
observations. On the other hand, evidence indicates that in the extreme
circumstances of social minefields, sometimes FPIC is the only
mechanism effective at slowing down extractive economic projects'
dizzying pace and contesting governmental decisions that back them. In
fact, in some cases, the consultation processes (and the litigation that
surrounds them) have been catalysts for the political mobilization of
affected peoples, along with national and international activist
networks. As such, consultation has asserted its place among the
political priorities of the international indigenous movement, just as it
took by storm the discussion that night in the Urri minefield.
I. ETHNICITY.GOV

A. Global Governance and the Regulation of Ethnicity
The rise of FPIC is neither gratuitous nor isolated. On the contrary,
its legal, procedural logic is part of an entire Zeitgeist: that of neoliberal
globalization taking place at the end of the twentieth century through
the beginning of the twenty-first. As Comaroff and Comaroff have
argued, an essential aspect of this era is the centrality of the law, or, in
their terms, the "fetishism of the law": the global faith in "the capacity
of constitutionalism and contract, rights and legal remedies, to
accomplish order, civility, justice, empowerment."3 1 The planetary
expansion of the law is palpable everywhere: in the avalanche of new
constitutions in the Global South; in the growing power of judiciaries

31. Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Millenial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a
Second Coming, in MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM AND THE CULTURE OF NEOLIBERALISM 1, 38
(Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff eds., 2001). For an insightful discussion of legal
fetishism in contexts of political violence, see JULIETA LEMAITRE, EL DERECHO COMO
CONJURO: FETICHISMO LEGAL, VIOLENCIA Y MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES [LAW AS A SPELL:
LEGAL FETISHISM, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS] (2009).
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around the world; 32 in the proliferation of "law and order" programs and
the "culture of legality" 33 in cities; in the judicialization of policy through
anticorruption programs led by judges and prosecutors; in the explosion
of private regulations, such as the voluntary standards on corporate
social responsibility; 34 and in the transmutation of social movements'
struggles into human rights litigation.35
The extension of this process into the domain of ethnicity is what I
call ethnicity.gov. It entails the juridification of collective claims of
cultural identity, self-determination, and control over territories and
resources--claims that are brought by indigenous peoples, Afrodescendant communities, and other ethnic groups in Latin America and
other parts of the world. Thus, with this concept, I seek to capture the
legal dimension that is central to the "politics of cultures."36
I use the term ethnicity.gov to refer to this process in order to create
a literal parallel that reveals its deep intertwining with another
fundamental process of ethnicity transformation in times of neoliberal
globalization, which Comaroff and Comaroff christen "Ethnicity, Inc."37
The latter consists of the "process of cultural commodification, and the
incorporation of identity in which it is imbricated." 38 It comprises
phenomena as diverse as the economic exploitation of cultural identity
(evident, for example, in the ecological and cultural tourism boom) and
the commercial protection of indigenous knowledge (reflected, for
example, in the patenting of indigenous traditional medicines).39 Just as
"Ethnicity, Inc. [is] . . . a projection of the entrepreneurial subject of

neoliberalism onto the plane of collective existence," 40 I argue that
32. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOcRAcY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (discussing how constitutional
courts in different parts of the world have become involved in resolving fundamental
political issues); SASKlA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 201 (2006).
33. John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Reflections on the Anthropology of Law,
Governance and Sovereignty, in RULES OF LAW AND LAWS OF RULING: ON THE
GOVERNANCE OF LAW 31, 33-34 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009).

34. See generally Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case of Hegemony
and Counter-Hegemony, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 92 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito
eds., 2005) [hereinafter LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW].
35. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C~sar Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, Politics, and

the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW, supra note 34, at 1.
36. CULTURES OF POLITICS/POLITICS OF CULTURES: RE-VISIONING LATIN AMERICAN
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Sonia E. Alvarez et al. eds., 1998).
37. JOHN L. COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, INC. 235 (2009).
38. Id. at 20.
39. See id. at 3 (citing RACHEL PROCTOR, CULTURAL SURVIVAL 2001).
40. Id. at 140.
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ethnicity.gov is the projection of the neoliberal legal subject .onto the
plane of collective rights. It thus concerns the collective legal subject,
whose two fundamental (neo)1iberal rights are recognized: freedom of
contract and due process. As our analysis of FPIC will demonstrate, we
are dealing with a legal subject constituted for the purpose of
participating in deliberations and consultations-processes that
transform collective conflicts into negotiations governed (at least on
paper) by due process principles (e.g., publicity, transparency, celerity).
Crucially, in line with the liberal fiction embedded in the institutions of
freedom of contract and due process, it is assumed from the outset that
the ethnic collective subject (e.g., an indigenous people) is on a level
playing field with the other subjects that will participate in the
consultations and negotiations (e.g., TNCs and the state entities
interested in economically exploiting indigenous territory). The
foregoing reflects the obvious affinity between the collective subjects of
Ethnicity, Inc. and ethnicity.gov. At the end of the day, the latter's
collective subject is the same "entrepreneurial subject" of the former,
but clothed with the legal attire of the "contracting party." The affinity
is so apparent that, in even more literal terms and borrowing from
Internet conventions, we could call the two processes "ethnicity.com"
and "ethnicity.gov," respectively. 41
Unlike the terminology used by Internet websites, I use the suffix
".gov" to denote governance, not government. As mentioned, the
juridification of ethnicity occurs not only through hard law that is
created by governments (and states in general), but also through a wide
range of soft law rules, such as the operational policies that multilateral
and private banks impose on companies that work in indigenous
territories and the codes of conduct that pertain to mining companies
that operate in these territories. Consequently, ethnicity.gov is marked
by the phenomenon of legal pluralism and comprises multiple
manifestations of governance without government.
By defining ethnicity.gov as a form of governance, I seek to capture
not only the diversity of its regulations, but also the content they have
in common. Beyond these legal forms' obvious differences in scope (i.e.,
focus and proponents), they have a common emphasis on consultation,
deliberation, and collaboration among "stakeholders" in ethnic rights
41. There are multiple indications of the overlap between these two processes. One
particularly revealing sign is the resemblance in their discourses. Note, for instance, the
centrality of the term "empowerment" in both. While the term is, as we will see,
ethnicity.gov's buzzword for ethnic groups' participation in decisions and regulations that
affect them, in ethnicity.com, the term is equally omnipresent and is associated with
"finding something essentially their own and theirs alone, something of their essence, to
sell. In other words, a brand." Id. at 15.
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disputes. Thus, given its content, ethnicity.gov exemplifies the
procedural legality of the "governance paradigm." 42
A wealth of studies on forms of regulation based on public-private
partnerships have theorized about and documented this paradigm. 43 At
its core, it is not top-down state regulation nor market self-regulation,
but rather a "third way," consisting of flexible regulations produced
through deliberation and cooperation among stakeholders, which
include companies, state entities, local communities, NGOs, unions, and
citizen associations. Employing diverse labels, 44 governance analysts
have asserted its relevance for regulatory problems as varied as the
global protection of labor rights, 45 environmental conservation, 46 and the
coordination of national policies and legal standards within regional
trading blocs. 47
The governance paradigm has been equally influential in the realms
of public policy and judicial reform. In effect, it has inspired countless
regulatory undertakings, from projects for institutional reform based on
the promotion of "good governance" (such as those of the World Bank)48
to voluntary, private regulation initiatives that make part of the
42. See generally Jessop, supra note 30.
43. For a critical overview of the governance literature, see C4sar Rodriguez-Garavito,

Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in
Global Apparel Factoriesin Mexico and Guatemala, 33 POL. & Soc'Y 203 (2005).
44. Among the terms used by governance theorists are "collaborative governance," "soft
law," "post-regulatory law," "democratic experimentalism," "reflexive law," and
"responsive regulation." See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Francis Snyder, Soft
Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF
EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMILE NOFL 197 (Stephen Martin ed., 1994); Gunther

Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986); Michael C.

Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.

REV. 267 (1998); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Charles Sabel, Bootstrapping Reform: Rebuilding Firms, the
Welfare State, and Unions, 23 POL. & SOC'Y 5 (1995).
45. See generally ARCHON FUNG, DARA O'ROURKE & CHARLES SABEL, CAN WE PUT AN
END TO SWEATSHOPS? (2001) (proposing market-driven regulatory systems to improve the
enforcement of labor rights).

46. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of
Collaboration,2002 Wis. L. REV. 555 (2002) (examining the changes and innovations in
environmental law).
47. GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
EXPERIMENTS (Jonathan Zeitlin & David Trubek eds., 2003) (examining "the common
challenges confronting the European Union and the United States as they reconfigure
work and welfare in a new economy and struggle to develop effective and legitimate
governance arrangements").

48. Tania Murray Li, The Law of the Project: Government and 'Good Governance' at the
World Bank in Indonesia, in RULES OF LAW AND LAWS OF RULING, supranote 33, at 237.
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corporate social responsibility industry (e.g., codes of conduct) 49 and
collaborative
regulatory
projects
undertaken
by
multilateral
organizations, like the ILO's "social dialogue"5 o and the United Nation's
Global Compact. 51
In summary, a specific type of legality dominates ethnicity.gov: that
of the governance paradigm, which, as Santos has argued, is the legal
matrix of neoliberal globalization. 52 The elective affinity between
neoliberalism and governance theories and practices lies precisely in the
fact that these theories and practices focus on participatory institutions'
procedural intricacies and explicitly leave aside discussion of the
material conditions necessary for genuine deliberations.5 3 In particular,
they bracket power asymmetries among participants in deliberations
(e.g., companies and indigenous communities engaged in consultation
processes) and the distributive and cultural conflicts that they entail. As
a consequence, the procedures and types of participation that they
support leave power relations untouched and replicate a vision of the
public sphere as a depoliticized space for collaboration among generic
"stakeholders."54
Accordingly, global governance and neoliberalism share a lexicon of
key terms such as "empowerment," "corporate social responsibility," and
"sustainable development."55 The fluency with which protagonists of
global liberalism-from TNCs to the World Bank-speak the language
of governance also follows from this. "We engage with a broad range of
peoples,
international
indigenous
stakeholders-governments,
organizations, communities, end-users, civil society organizations, and
academia-in a bid to strengthen performance and enhance our
contribution to sustainable development," 56 declares the website of the
ICMM (i.e., the global association of mining TNCs).
As a synthesis of the relationship between neoliberalism and
governance, the statement is difficult to surpass. The fact that this
reference comes from the industry involved in the most intense conflicts
with indigenous peoples foretells ethnicity.gov's tensions and
49. See generally Shamir, supra note 34.
50. See generally Social Dialogue, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/themes/
sd.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).

51. See

generally

United

Nations

Global

Compact,

UNITED

NATIONs,

http-/www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
52. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social

Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW, supra note 34, at 29, 35.
53. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 44, at 409.
54. For a development of this critique, see Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 43, at 209-10.
55. See generally Santos, supranote 52; Svampa, supra note 8.
56. About Us, ICMM, http://www.icmm.com/about-us (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
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contradictions in the specific domain of indigenous rights. In the
following section, I sketch these tensions as a prelude to a more in-depth
analysis of the way in which they operate in the specific field of FPIC.
B. Ethnicity.gov Meets Indigenous Peoples: Legal Struggles Around
Multiculturalism and Indigenous Rights
Ethnicity.gov is not a peaceful process. In the area of indigenous
rights in particular, the governance paradigm has been contested from
below by a counterhegemonic legality that has evolved in tandem: that
of the transnational movement advocating indigenous rights.5 7
The origins of international law on indigenous peoples date back to
the transnational activism that produced the movement's first
milestone: the U.N. Human Rights Commission's resolution in 1971,
which called upon the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities to study "the problem of discrimination
against indigenous populations" and formulate measures for eliminating
it." Over a decade later, the mandate led to the influential "Martinez
Cobo report,"59 which was followed by the mobilization of indigenous
peoples and human rights NGOs, urging the creation of contemporary
international law's pioneer institution on the subject: the U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Populations. Established in 1982, the Working
Group produced the first draft of the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in 1994, which, after over a decade of discussions
and numerous revisions, led to the final Declaration that was approved
by the U.N. General Assembly in 2007. The Declaration is an icon in the
globalization of indigenous rights and, together with the aforementioned
ILO Convention 169 of 1989, constitutes a central reference point in
international law on the subject.

57. For overviews of this global movement and the resulting legal instruments, see
generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004);
RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF
IDENTITY (2003). On Latin America, see generally ALISON BRYSK, FROM TRIBAL VILLAGE
To GLOBAL VILLAGE: INDIAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
(2000); MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, DIVERSITY, AND
DEMOCRACY (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002) [hereinafter MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN
AMERICA]; DONNA LEE VAN COT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE POLITICS
OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000).

58. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), The Problem of Indigenous
Populations, Res. 1589(L) 1 7, U.N. Doc. E/5044 (May 21, 1971).
59. Special Rapporteur, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476, United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, SubComm. for the Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, (July 30, 1981) (by
Jos6 R. Martinez Cobo).
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The global movement's Leitmotiv is the demand for the recognition
of indigenous peoples' right to self-determination,6 0 which is a right that
is only partially enshrined in legal instruments-to a greater extent in
some (e.g., the Declaration) than in others (e.g., the Convention 169).
The substantive legality that derives from the principle of selfdetermination contrasts noticeably with governance's procedural
legality. From a political and cultural point of view, indigenous claims
typically do not include demands for territorial secession, but they do
embody a variety of multiculturalism that entails a degree of autonomy
over territories and economic resources that surpasses the degree
Neoliberal
multiculturalism." 61
by
"neoliberal
contemplated
multiculturalism, for its part, recognizes cultural difference and
collective rights, as long as they do not give rise to this type of
entitlement and do not question, as indigenous claims do, the
conventional conceptions of economic development.
At the national level, the transnational law on indigenous peoples
has rapidly permeated constitutions, especially in Global South
countries that underwent political transitions and proceeded to
incorporate this law into new constitutions. Latin America, the region
on which this article is focused, presents the most vivid illustration of
this trend. The Guatemalan Constitution of 1985 inaugurated a regional
wave of "multicultural constitutionalism," 62 which was joined by
Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992),
Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), Argentina (1994), Mexico (1994), Venezuela
(1998), and, especially, Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009) 63-with each
country recognizing the right of self-determination to a different extent.
The convergence of the global indigenous rights movement with Latin
American multicultural constitutionalism is evident not only from the
various constitutions that have incorporated Convention 169's norms,
but also from the fact that the ten countries from the above-mentioned
group that have ratified the Convention6 4 constitute nearly half of the
65
countries that have ratified the instrument worldwide.
The judicialization of conflicts over collective rights is the other
fundamental component of multicultural constitutionalism and, thus, is
60. ANAYA, supra note 57, at 97.

61. Charles R. Hale, Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights
and Racial Dominance in CentralAmerica, 28 PoLAR 1, at 10, 26 (2005).
62. VAN Corr, supranote 57, at 257.
63. BARTOLOMe CLAVERO, GEOGRAFiA JURIDICA DE AMERICA LATINA: PUEBLOS
INDIGENAS ENTRE CONSTITUCIONES MESTIZAS [LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF LATIN AMERICA:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AMONG MESTIZO CONSTITUTIONS] (2008).
64. The sole exception in the group is Nicaragua.
65. At the time of writing, twenty-two countries had ratified Convention 169. C 169,
ILOLEX, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifcs.pl?C169 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
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a key part of the global indigenous rights movement's contribution to
ethnicity.gov. As is apparent in Latin America, courts have become
central actors in the juridification of ethnicity, as the indigenous
movement's political claims have materialized in hundreds of cases
being litigated before constitutional courts and bodies of the InterAmerican System of Human Rights.66
The most explicit example of this tendency is found in Colombia,
where the judicialization of ethnic conflicts has become so profound that
legal mobilization is now a defining strategy of the indigenous
movement.67 "For this reason, Colombian indigenous leaders prompted
us to go to law school after the 1991 Constitution," said the General
Secretary of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC),
himself a lawyer, in our interview. 68 In addition to leading cases decided
by the Inter-American Court of Human RightS69 and, above all, Ecuador
and Bolivia's new constitutions, which are based explicitly on the
principle of plurinationalism, 70 Colombian constitutional law has gone
the farthest in incorporating some of the corollaries of the selfdetermination principle demanded by the global indigenous movement.
Beyond the intricacies of national legal norms, it is important to
highlight two key points here to complete the characterization of
ethnicity.gov. First, the joint effect of the global indigenous rights
movement and the rise of multicultural constitutionalism has been a
profound juridification of indigenous peoples' political and cultural
claims. As fieldwork throughout the region has revealed, Latin
American indigenous leaders today have to spend as much time in
indigenous territories as in key legal forums: human rights NGOs,

66. For an analysis of the proliferation of national and regional jurisprudence on
indigenous rights, specifically the right to prior consultation, see Christian Courtis, Notes
on the Implementation by Latin American Courts of the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous
Peoples, 10 SUR-INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 53 (June 2009).
67. See LEMAITRE, supranote 31.
68. Interview with Luis Fernando Arias, ONIC General Secretary, in Chemesquemena,
Kankuamo reservation, Colombia (June 16, 2010) (author's translation of interview).
69. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (Nov. 28, 2007); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146,
(Mar. 29, 2006). For an early assessment of the Inter-American Court's jurisprudence with
regard to indigenous land issues, see generally S. James Anaya and Robert A. Williams,
Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and NaturalResources Under
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HAR. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001). For a recent
critical assessment, see generally Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land
Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudenceof the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in
Light of the United Nations Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 Wis. INT'L
L. J. 51 (2009).
70. SANTOS, supranote 23.

282

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1

government agencies, constitutional tribunals, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in Washington, and the offices of
specialized U.N. bodies in Geneva (e.g., the Special Rapporteur on
Indigenous Peoples, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, and
the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination).71
Secondly, the coexistence of the legality of the global indigenous
rights movement and the legality of the governance paradigm implies
obvious tensions and contradictions. Ethnicity.gov is an intensely
controversial legal field in which the dominance of neoliberal legalitybased on freedom of contract and due process-is constantly contested
by the legality that is based on indigenous self-determination.
Therefore, norms on indigenous rights result from the complex
interactions among actors of these two regulatory strategies at both the
international and national levels.
The clearest example of the interaction between these two legalities
is the regulation of FPIC, ethnicity.gov's emblematic institution. In the
remainder of this article, I focus on this figure in order to empirically
unpack the regulation and operation of ethnicity.gov.
II. PRIOR CONSULTATION AND THE REGULATION OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
The tension between the legalities associated with governance and
the international indigenous rights movement is evident from the very
discussions within the ILO that led to Convention 169's adoption. From
the beginning, the objective of replacing indigenous peoples'
"integration" with their "participation" in deciding matters affecting
them was the key reason behind the ILO's decision to revise Convention
107. In fact, such motivation was expressed in the document presented
by the organization's Secretariat to the experts convened for the
revision in Geneva in 1986.72 Experts and delegates from the three
sectors of the ILO (i.e., employers, workers, and states) agreed to reject
the aspiration indicated in Convention 107's preamble: to "facilitate" the
"progressive integration [of indigenous peoples] into their respective
national communities."73 However, controversy surrounding the concept
of participation was evident. While a large segment of experts supported
the proposal made by such organizations as the World Council of
71. Interview with Luis Evelis Andrade, ONIC President, in Geneva, Switzerland
(Aug. 11, 2009); Interview with Javier de la Rosa, lawyer for indigenous affairs, Instituto
de Defensa Legal, Lima, Peru (Aug. 10, 2010).
72. See Tony Simpson, ILO 107- A License to Rights, Aboriginal Law Bulletin 7 (1987),
availableat http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AboriginalLawB/1987/7.html#fnl.
73. ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, pmbl., adopted June 26, 1957,
328 U.N.T.S. 247.
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Indigenous Peoples, which implied substituting participation with
indigenous peoples' control of their socioeconomic conditions, employers'
delegates tended to support the idea of participation and objected to
recommendations that were based on the principle of indigenous
peoples' self-determination. 74 The effort to reach a compromise between
these two positions is apparent in the report that the experts presented
to the ILO, which recommended that the Convention's revision
guarantee that indigenous peoples have "as much control as possible
over their own economic, social and cultural development."7 5
Importantly, the experts recommended creating a procedural
mechanism as an intermediary solution for cases in which the affected
indigenous group's consent could not be obtained. The solution, prior
consultation's precursor, consisted in requiring that participation
include public review of the matter in question in which indigenous
representatives would partake.76
The contrast between the two positions increased during the 1988
and 1989 ILO conferences, in which the Convention's revision was
debated. The original proposal of the ILO's Office, which included a
more stringent requirement that governments "seek the consent" of
indigenous peoples in relation to decisions affecting the latter, met with
strong resistance from many states and employers' organizations. Given
this situation, the Office modified its proposal as it looked ahead to the
final conference in 1989 and, thus, adopted the weaker formulation of
"consultation" that was ultimately enshrined in the final approved text
of Convention 169.77 In this way, according to Rodriguez-Pifiero,
"'consultation', 'participation', and 'respect for identity' became the
themes of a never too-well articulated discourse which appealed to
pragmatism and easily acceptable values, while explicitly avoiding
principle-based discussion that could raise the ILO constituency's
concern on political grounds," thus, revealing that, despite the obvious
consensus against integrationism, there was "no clear alternative
78
discourse upon which to draw-only pieces thereof."
Although this conclusion duly highlights FPIC's political functionthat is, to serve as a procedural compromise between two substantively
74. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Current Development: Revision of ILO Convention No. 107,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 756, 759 (1987).
75. Id. at 761 (citing the expert's report, ILO Doc. APPLMER/107/1986/D.7, at 32)
(emphasis added).
76. Barsh, supra note 74, at 761.
77. RODRIGUEZ-PI&ERO, supra note 13, at 381; see also James Anaya, Indigenous
Peoples' ParticipatoryRights in Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource Extraction:
The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and
Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 12 (2005).
78. RODRIGUEZ-PINERO, supranote 13, at 299.
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opposing positions-it overlooks the fact that consultation itself is an
alternative discourse. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, FPIC
echoes the discourse of global governance, which was gaining ground at
the time of Convention 169's adoption and on its way to becoming the
hegemonic legal discourse of globalization at the turn of the century.
The fit between consultation and governance explains the ease with
which FPIC was incorporated into the neoliberal mainstream,
specifically in the discourse of economic development. In Convention 169
itself, FPIC's rights-based dimension is situated within the economic
framework of the "development process."79 Despite the fact that, as we
will see, the tensions between collective rights and development have
resurfaced in practice over the course of actual consultations, it is clear
that the final text of Convention 169 subordinates FPIC to the priority
of economic development. This helps explain the fact that actors of
global neoliberalism, from multilateral banks to TNCs, have embraced
FPIC, finding it to be a useful and business-friendly mechanism for
responding to growing criticisms of their operations' impact on
indigenous peoples. In fact, FPIC became a key component of the
discursive adjustments with which the "development project"so was
repackaged and re-exported across the world. Put differently, once
stricter demands relating to the principle of self-determination were
purged from consultation, neoliberalism's global actors were able to
convert it into another adjective for qualifying, yet maintaining and
reinforcing, the discourse of development. For example, in the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB), participation, empowerment, and
consultation have become the core of the "development with identity"
approach, which inspired the IAIDB's recent Operational Policy on
Indigenous Peoples.*81 Consultation's incorporation into the development
endeavor is reflected most clearly in the words of the director of the
IADB division that formulated the Operational Policy-words which
also provide a perfect statement of the aforementioned Ethnicity, Inc.:
79. 'The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the
process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual wellbeing and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent
possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall
participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes
for national and regional development which may affect them directly." ILO, Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 7(1), adopted
June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
80. On the origins and trajectory of development as a transnational project, see PHILIP
MCMICHAEL, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2008).
81. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUSTAINABLE DEV. DEP'T, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES & CMTY. DEv. UNIT, OPERATIONAL POLICY ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Feb. 22,
2006).
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"[indigenous peoples are increasingly interested in using their assets of
natural resources, cultural heritage, and social capital as vehicles for
82
With equal
improving their social and economic conditions."
transparency, the same source reveals the connection between
"development with identity" and Ethnicity, Inc., on the one hand, and
the language of governance and ethnicity.gov, on the other: "[o]ver the
years, the IADB has developed a number of projects incorporating good
practices, such as participatory planning, socio-cultural issues,
decentralized execution mechanisms, the linkages between the
strengthening of environmentally- and territorially-based aspects to
local participation in management and decision- making."83
In the language adopted by the World Bank, consultation became a
prefix, rather than an adjective. Yet, the result-the "ethnodevelopment" approach 84 -is the same, insofar as it involves a businessfriendly version of FPIC and indigenous rights that fits into the
mainstream development discourse, now amended to include the
governance paradigm's participatory and procedural tinge. As a World
Bank-requested independent report on the impact of its extractive
industry loans concluded,8 5 in addition to invoking a weak version of
consultation, the Bank's operational policies regarding indigenous
peoples fail to establish effective monitoring mechanisms and are rarely
applied in practice.86
In the absence of strict procedural standards and effective
monitoring mechanisms and sanctions, the version of FPIC endorsed in
multilateral bank directives and TNC codes of conduct embodies the two
principal limitations of the governance paradigm mentioned earlier. On
the one hand, the lack of procedural guarantees to mitigate the
profound power asymmetries among indigenous communities,
corporations, and states render consultation a form of participation in
which indigenous peoples have limited negotiating leverage and even

82. Anne Deruyttere, Perceived Challenges to Recognition of Prior and Informed
Consent of Indigenous Peoples and Other Local Communities: The Experiences of the InterAmerican Development Bank, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 40, 41 (2004).
83. Id. at 42.
84. Shelton H. Davis, Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and ParticipatoryDevelopment: The
Experience of the World Bank in Latin America, MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA,
supra note 57, at 227, 233.
85. 2 WORLD BANK GROUP, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. REV., STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE:

STAKEHOLDER INPUTS: CONVERGING ISSUES AND DIVERGING VIEWS ON THE WORLD BANK
GROUP'S INVOLVEMENT IN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 48-49 (Dec. 2003).
86. Fergus MacKay, The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous
Peoples: Progressor More of the Same? 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65, 67 (2005); Brant
McGee, The Community Referendum: ParticipatoryDemocracy and the Right to Free,Prior
and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 570, 575 (2009).
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more limited decision-making power. On the other hand, the absence of
effective and functional monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms is
reminiscent of the preference for self-regulation inherent in
governance's approach, which accounts for the ineffectiveness of
operational policies and voluntary standards recognizing the duty to
consult indigenous peoples.
Similar limitations are apparent in the version of consultation
incorporated into legislation in the majority of states that have ratified
Convention 169.87 As a result, this dominant version of FPIC and this
interpretation of Convention 169 are central pieces of what Charles R.
Hale calls "neoliberal multiculturalism," which is the legal regime that
recognizes cultural rights, but denies, de facto or de jure, "the assertion
of control over resources necessary for those rights to be realized."88 It is
the type of multiculturalism and consultation that is today prevalent
even in those Latin American countries that have joined the wave of
and ethnodevelopment, without
multicultural constitutionalism
addressing the structural causes of indigenous peoples' exclusion or
establishing forms of participation with decision-making power.89
This does not mean that the details and procedural rules are
inconsequential or that FPIC's regulation has been devoid of
controversy. On the contrary, each step taken to regulate FPIC or to put
it into practice sparks ethnicity.gov's characteristic tension, between
neoliberal legality (which focuses on the procedure of consultation, as a
manifestation of contractual freedom between supposedly equal parties)
and the legality of indigenous rights (which assesses the procedure in
terms of its outcomes, that is, in terms of the degree to which it allows
for indigenous peoples to freely consent to or reject the project or
decision under consideration as an expression of their right to selfdetermination).
The interaction between these two positions has given rise to
multiple interpretations of Convention 169 and to the creation of new
instruments of international law. As for Convention 169, national and
international bodies in charge of applying it have adopted diverse
interpretations located at different points along the spectrum between
consultation and consent. For example, although the ILO committees
that review complaints alleging violations of Convention 169 opt for the
former, they have also strengthened consultation's procedural
87. For an overview of the regulation and operation of FPIC in Latin America, see
generally the essays compiled by the Foundation for the Due Process of Law, 14
APORTESDPLF (2010).
88. Hale, supra note 61, at 13.
89. See Rachel Sieder, Introduction, in MULTICULTURALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra
note 57, at 1, 14.
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guarantees and have found violations of the Convention on multiple
occasions, as in the case of Colombia's Urri dam.90 Meanwhile,
international human rights bodies, such as the U.N. Rapporteurship on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights,9 1 have adopted interpretations of international law in
general, and of Convention 169 in particular, which uphold the
consultation requirement but also establish the stricter requisite of
obtaining consent when dealing with large-scale development projects
that may profoundly impact an indigenous people. For their part,
national courts have established extremely varied jurisprudence, which
ranges from weak interpretations, (i.e., a procedural conception of
consultation, as in Ecuador) 92 to strong interpretations closest to the
positions of the U.N. Rappporteurship and the Inter-American Court
(i.e., the recent decisions of the Colombian Constitutional Court),93 and
including intermediary positions similar to those of the ILO (i.e., the
Peruvian 94 constitutional tribunal).
Beyond Convention 169's text and interpretation, the dispute over
establishing FPIC's standards has been apparent in the process of
adopting the most recent international legal instrument on the subject:
the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Upon
studying the reports produced during the eleven years of discussions
held by the Working Group established in 1995 by the Commission on
Human Rights to draft the Declaration, one sees clearly that the reason
why the process took so long (and why it nearly fell through in 2005
only to be saved by an ad hoc workshop held in Mexico) was precisely
the continuing disagreement between indigenous organizations and a

90. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/09,
United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Hum. Rts., (Jan. 21, 2003) (by Rodolfo
Stavenhagen) [hereinafter Situationof Human Rights].
91. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (Nov. 28, 2007).
92. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 18, 2010, Sentencia 00110-SIN-CC (Ecuador) (declaring constitutional the National Mining Code and rejecting
legal arguments about the violation of constitutional provisions on FPIC brought up by
the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, the national indigenous
organization).
93. Corte Constitucional [C.C.], octubre 2, 2009, Sentencia T-769/09 (suspending
copper exploration in Western Colombia until FPIC is conducted with local indigenous
peoples, and declaring that consent is required when development projects can have a
profound impact on an indigenous community).
94. Robert Kozak, Dow Jones Newswires, DJ Court Orders Peru to Consult Indiginous
[sic] Peoples on Mining, Oil Projects,TRADINGMARKETS.COM (Sept. 1, 2010, 14:56:15 EDT),
http://www.tradingmarkets.comlnews/stock-alert/mioie dj-court-orders-peru-to-consultindiginous-peoples-on-mining-oil-projects-1145502.html.
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large segment of states regarding the standard of participation that
should be incorporated into the Declaration. While the former group
demanded consent, the latter preferred a form of consultation that was
similar to that of Convention 169. The compromise found in the final
Declaration text, which the U.N. General Assembly approved in 2007,
consisted of a hybrid that upheld the general standard of FPIC, but
went further than Convention 169 in the direction of the indigenous
groups' proposal by establishing that consultations should be carried out
with the objective of obtaining the consent of indigenous peoples95 and
directly requiring consent for relocating an indigenous people from their
territory.9 6
In sum, after two decades of existence, FPIC has become a central
institution in the transnational regulation of indigenous rights. Thus, it
embodies the dominant modality of ethnicity.gov and multiculturalism
in the neoliberal era. However, consultation is situated within a highly
dynamic and complex sociolegal field, coexisting-at times in tension
and at times merged in different hybrid forms-with other legal
approaches to the "indigenous question." The actors, principles, and
mechanisms pertaining to this question are condensed in Table 1. On
the one hand, consultation coexists with the remnants of the
integrationist paradigm, which, while superseded by international law
instruments, continues to be highly influential in legal regimes around
the world that consider indigenous peoples as objects of national
development policies, rather than as legal subjects and right bearers.97
On the other hand, consultation coexists with a counterhegemonic form
of multiculturalism, which is advocated by the global indigenous rights
movement, inspired by the principle of self-determination, and
embodied by the standard of free, prior, and informed consent.98 A
telling illustration of this variant of multiculturalism is found in
Guatemala in autonomous consultations organized by indigenous
communities, which mounted a challenge to neoliberal economic policies

95. United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, arts. 19, 32, G.A.
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].
96. Id. art. 10.
97. I take the distinction between policy- and rights-based approaches to indigenous
peoples from BARTOLOM9 CLAVERO, DERECHO INDIGENA Y CULTURA CONSTITUCIONAL EN
AMtRICA [INDIGENOUS LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE IN AMERICA] 75 (1994).
98. This characterization of indigenous, counterhegemonic multiculturalism draws on
Santos' theory of multiculturalism and human rights. Boaventura de Sousa Santos,

Toward a MulticulturalConception of Human Rights, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY 39, 44 (Berta Hernandez-Truyol ed., 2002). On law and counterhegemonic
globalization, see Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 35.
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and corporate-led consultations, and resulted in decisive votes against
mining projects in their territories.99
Table 1. Legal approaches to indigenous peoples
Neoliberal

Governing

Counterhegemonic

Integrationism
Assimilation

multiculturalism
Participation

multiculturalism
Self-determination

Regulation

Governance

Collective rights

principle

Legal
paradigm

Mode of
participation
Indigenous
peoples' legal
status
Legal bases

None

Consultation

Consent

Objects of
policies

Objects of
policies/subjects of
rights
ILO Convention
169 (weak
interpretation);
multicultural
constitutions

Subjects of rights

Key actors

Governments

ILO Convention
107, national
constitutions

Governments,
courts, ILO, TNCs,
multilateral banks

ILO Convention 169
(strong interpretation);
U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous
Peoples;
jurisprudence (InterAmerican Court of
Human Rights,
Colombia); pluricultural
constitutions (Bolivia,
Ecuador); indigenous
legal systems
Indigenous
organizations and
communities, human
rights NGOs, courts,
ILO, U.N. organs
(Rapporteurship on
Indigenous Peoples,
Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues,
Working Group on
Indigenous
Populations)

99. Amanda Fulmer, Angelina Snodgrass Godoy & Philip Neff, Indigenous Rights,
Resistance and the Law: Lessons from a GuatemalanMine, 4 LATIN AM. POL. AND SoC'Y 91
(2008); Rachel Sieder, El derecho indigena y la globalizaci6n legal en la posguerra
guatemalteca (Indigenous Law and Legal Globalization in Post-War Guatemala), 16
ALTERIDADES 23 (2006).
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As in all typologies, for the purposes of analytic clarity, Table 1
stylizes and underscores the differences among the categories of
interest-in this case, the three approaches to indigenous rights. In
practice, of course, international legal instruments, national judicial
decisions, legislation, and other legal artifacts often straddle the-middle
ground between ideal types. In fact, as I have highlighted throughout
this section and summarized in the table, Convention 169's
interpretations range from weak ones (from the viewpoint of indigenous
rights) that are clearly entrenched in neoliberal multiculturalism (e.g.,
those dominant in companies' codes of conduct and multilateral banks'
operational policies) to strong understandings that draw upon
counterhegemonic multiculturalism, thereby establishing stringent
procedural rules and even combining consultation with consent (e.g., the
U.N. Declaration and some rulings and recommendations of entities like
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the U.N. bodies that
work on indigenous rights).
The ambiguous character of Convention 169 illustrates a broader
point. Ultimately, the effects of regulatory frameworks on FPIC-as
those of law in general-result from both the limits and opportunities
created by the legal rules, on the one hand, and the subjective
understandings and legal strategies of the actors that use them, on the
other.100 My interviews and ethnographic research show that the same
rules (e.g., those of Convention 169) are often invoked by indigenous
peoples and the corporations keen on commercially exploiting
indigenous territories. The hegemonic or counterhegemonic effects of
those rules, therefore, are partly determined by the relative success of
their competing interpretations in a specific dispute.
The synthesis portrayed in Table 1 allows us to appreciate the
diversity and internal tensions of ethnicity.gov as it relates to
indigenous rights. If we shift from analyzing consultation's regulation to
empirically studying its application, we will see even more vividly the
reasons behind the protagonism of this institution, as well as behind the
battles over its procedures and ramifications and the hybrids that result
from them. This is the step that I take in wrapping up the analysis in
the next section.

100. I am grateful to Angelina Snodgrass-Godoy and Rodrigo Uprimny for comments
that helped me elucidate this point.
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III. ETHNICITY.GOV IN ACTION: THE EFFECTS OF CONSULTATION IN
PRACTICE

There is an abysmal difference between the contexts in which FPIC is
regulated and the contexts in which consultations actually occur (i.e., in
the social minefields that often serve as the stage for conflicts over
territories, resources, and indigenous cultures). In these minefields, there
is a glaring absence of the minimum conditions necessary for
communication-conditions that have been envisioned by regulatory
bodies, such as the ILO, the United Nations, multilateral banks, and
courts, attempting to project the image and semblance of their own
deliberations onto this disputed terrain. Thus, in places like Colombia's
Urri dam or the oil fields of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Amazon,
consultation takes on unexpected contours and produces profoundly
ambiguous, even contradictory, effects, resulting from a singular cocktail
of legal formalities, volatile social relations, and life-or-death struggles.
Given this article's interest in FPIC as a paradigmatic form of
ethnicity.gov, I will highlight here some of consultation's effects that
illustrate and question two traits of ethnicity.gov: the predominance of
procedural rationality and the power relations among (supposedly)
equal parties participating in the consultation process. I argue that, in
the context of minefields, these characteristics yield four sets of
consequences that define consultation in practice: (1) the displacement
effect, (2) the miscommunication effect, (3) the domination effect, and (4)
the emancipation effect. I now briefly turn to each.
A. The DisplacementEffect
The first thing about a consultation proceeding that strikes an
outside observer is the contrast that was obvious that night, in mid2010, in the jungle around the UrrA dam, when the PowerPoint slides
were running on the power of the only electric generator available in the
reservation of the Embera-Katio. In the midst of a literal minefield, the
leader of the Embera, who are victims of "a clear case of ethnocide"10 1 in
the words of the U.N. Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, focused his
conversation on procedural intricacies of the most recent proceeding in
the case of the Embera people pending before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights for violation of the right to consultation.
His focus included the appeal being planned by the Urri corporation
against the Ministry of Environment's decision to deny the license
needed for the dam's new phase of construction, and the usefulness of
101. Situation of Human Rights, supranote 90, at 15.
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the Constitutional Court's recently established precedent that requires
obtaining consent for certain economic projects being carried out in
indigenous territories.
This contrast suggests that, both in Urri and in other cases,
consultation's procedural steps displace, replace, or postpone the more
substantive conflicts. This is what I refer to when I speak of
consultation's displacement effect. How is this contrast produced? In
circumstances in which disagreements touch upon the most vital
convictions and interests of the parties involved, how is it possible that
the conversation becomes dominated by formalities regarding deadlines,
legal recourse, notification, and certification of legal representatives?
As I have already suggested, consultation's global diffusion and
protagonism in ethnicity.gov are due precisely to its displacing effect: its
power to transform substance into form and its capacity to offer a point
of contact among actors defending extremely different, even
antagonistic, positions. That capacity is rendered even more explicitand consultation's transactional character all the more useful-when
the differences among the parties are more profound and potentially
explosive, as occurs in minefields. This is where law's role as a means of
equalizing differences is clearest, as Comaroff and Comaroff suggest:
In situations of ruptured hyphen-nation, situations in
which the world is constructed out of apparently
irreducible difference, the language of the law affords an
ostensibly neutral medium for people of differencedifferent cultural worlds, different social endowments,
different material circumstances, differently constructed
identities-to make claims on each other and the polity,
to enter into contractual relations, to transact unlike
values, and to deal with their conflicts. In so doing, it
forges the impression of consonance amidst contrast, of
the existence of universal standards that, like money,
facilitate the negotiation of incommensurables across
otherwise intransitive boundaries. 102
The empirical evidence on FPIC allows us to make two comments
about this lucid observation, which help to give greater specificity to
consultation's role and significance. First, while it is true that law
generally fulfills this equalizing function, it is actually procedural law
that does so in a paradigmatic way. In legal procedure, the law's
appearance of neutrality is taken to an extreme because its rules deal
102. Comaroff& Comaroff, supra note 31, at 39.
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precisely with universal measures: time, money, and space. Procedural
norms invoke these measurements in pure, legal form, apparently
cleansed of any relation to the conflicts' substance. In consultation's
realm, those forms consist of deadlines, timelines, expenses, and
locations for consultation meetings. They are what permit
communication among incommensurables.
Second, it is possible to extend the Simmelian allusion to money's
equalizing power and its functional similarity to law even further. In
fact, the allusion confirms the parallel between Ethnicity, Inc. and
ethnicity.gov: while the principal medium for exchange in the former is
money, in the latter, it is (procedural) law. Furthermore, the affinity
between the two processes is so significant that it is misleading to speak
of parallels, since the two are constantly intertwined in practice. The
protagonism of monetary compensation in consultations among states,
companies, and indigenous peoples illustrates this point. A large part of
consultation processes consists of calculating the economic project's
possible cultural and environmental harm and agreeing on a form of
compensation for the people affected. The same occurs in litigation
deriving from the lack of consultation or inadequate consultations. In
these cases, since damage has already been inflicted, the courts' task is
to determine the means and amount of compensation. Although the
reparation adopted is not monetary in some cases, in many other
situations, the compensation is pecuniary. In these latter circumstances,
money and law are fused into one.
This amalgam is evident in the emblematic Urri lawsuit. When the
Colombian Constitutional Court decided the case alleging a violation of
the right to consultation, the dam had already become an irreversible
reality. In the five years since the dam's construction, the Sini River
had been diverted and part of the Embera-Katio's territory flooded. 103 In
light of the situation, the Court decided to:
"order the Urrt Company Inc. to indemnify the Upper
Sinti Embera-Katio indigenous people, at least in an
amount sufficient for guaranteeing their physical
survival, while they confront the economic, social, and
cultural changes from which they can no longer escape
and for which the project owners and the State denied
them the opportunity to choose or refuse, in clear
10 4
violation of the Constitution and effective legislation."

103. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 1998, Sentencia
T-652/98.
104. Id. (author's translation).
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The Court then determined that the compensation should consist of
money, specifically, the payment of a monthly sum over the following
twenty years, "corresponding to a food and transportation subsidy to be
paid by the company owning the project to each and every member of
the indigenous people . . . in order to guarantee the people's physical
survival . . . while they educate the next generation to prevent their

culture's disappearance in the medium term." 0 5 A lower court
subsequently determined the compensation's exact amount, which,
adjusting for inflation, is today approximately the equivalent of eighty
dollars per month, per person. 106
The court's decision to order monetary compensation and the Urri
company's initiation of periodic payments after forming a trust for that
purpose in 1999 have had profound and probably irreversible
consequences, some of which are tragic. With regard to my argument in
this article, the compensation illustrates, as vividly as it does painfully,
consultation's displacement effect and its intertwinement with cultural
commodification. As one Embera leader expressed during an interview,
many of his people's communities, which had been self-sufficient when
the river sustained its own economy and culture, now depend entirely
on the monetary compensation for survival.107 In other words, their
collective identity has been transformed in just one decade. Today, it is
defined by the Emberas' role as individual consumers in the market
economy, a shift provoked by the compensation's precarious, but
essential
funds.
The process
of identity's commodification,
individualization, and pauperization has been accompanied by the
above-mentioned effect of legal displacement. In fact, the dependence,
vis-A-vis compensation, is so significant that the Embera political
leadership believes that the greatest threat posed by the company's
plans for expansion to the people's cultural survival is that many
communities may actually accept definitive flooding of their territories
in exchange for prolonging the payouts. 0 8
In sum, FPIC's procedural nature allows for communication among
incommensurable substantive positions, due to the displacement of the
latter by the former. As the Urri experience suggests, consultation's
power of facilitating communication has costs. Moreover, as we will see
105. Id. (author's translation). For the decision specifying the twenty-year period, see
Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 1, 2008, Auto Aclaratorio a
la Sentencia T-652/98.
106. Tribunal Superior de Monteria [High Court of the City of Monteria], noviembre 12,
2005, Sentencia de Liquidaci6n de Indemnizaci6n.
107. Interview with legal advisor to the Embera-Katio people, in Tierralta, Colom. (Nov.
14, 2009).
108. Interview with Embera leader, in Zambud6, Embera-Katio reservation, Colom.
(June 13, 2010).
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in the next section, when consultation operates under the circumstances
of minefields, it is also highly imperfect.
B. The Miscommunication Effect
Those who attend negotiations and discussions during a
consultation process will notice something strange. When it seems that
a point on the agenda has been exhausted or an agreement has been
reached, it is common that the conversation returns to the same matters
or, in fact, discussion of them in a subsequent meeting begins again
from scratch. For this reason, unless the proceedings are perfunctory or
imposed under deception or coercion (which is not infrequent),
consultations tend to follow a nonlinear path in which delays, repetition,
and misunderstandings are endemic.
Once again, the case of the Urri dam is indicative of this tendency.
In effect, one of the principal points of controversy among the parties to
the case is whether an agreement had ever been reached. In other
words, the state, the company, and the Embera-Katio have not agreed
on the existence of an agreement. While the first two maintain that they
reached an agreement with the Embera in 1999, allowing the dam to be
filled following the Court's decision, the Embera argue that such an
agreement never existed. To complicate the misunderstanding further,
the consultation process, as it often does, produced an internal division
within the Embera people. Thus, some communities currently argue
that there was an agreement, while others disagree.10 9 Considerable
uncertainty results, thus aggravating the lack of confidence among the
parties and heightening rather than mitigating the volatility of the
situation on the ground.
How are such misunderstandings produced? What causes
miscommunication, which is so prevalent that it leads to constant
communication breakdown among the parties and to long stalls in
consultation processes? One of the primary causes is that consultations
embody a discursive clash, in which claims and different kinds of
knowledge, based on radically distinct epistemological roots, get crossed.
In a stark historical short circuit, consultations combine "premodern"
indigenous claims, "postmodern" designs of global governance, and
classical "modern" forms of primitive accumulation of capital-all of
which are smelted in the crucible of modern legal forms par excellence:
due process and freedom of contract.

109. Focus group with Embera leaders, in Zambud6, Embera-Katio reservation, Colom.
(Nov. 14, 2009).
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I The misunderstandings that can arise from this epistemic Tower of
Babel are apparent in various consultation processes that I have
observed. One particularly telling and internationally known case is the
consultation of the U'wa people, which derived from Occidental
Petroleum's plans for oil exploration in the U'wa's territory in eastern
Colombia."10 The U'wa's consultation process has lasted for nearly
twenty years, and a stalemate among the parties persists, due in part to
the countervailing power of a coalition of indigenous and environmental
NGOs worldwide that have assembled in solidarity with the U'wa.
Beyond the case's intricacies, what is interesting to highlight is the
abyss between the State and the oil companies' pro-extraction vision
and the U'wa's conception of territory and oil-both sacred and
untouchable, to the point where the U'wa have announced that they will
commit collective suicide in the event of oil exploration in their
territory."' The result is a breakdown in communication, unresolved by
the procedural mechanism of consultation, as various paradoxical
incidents in the case reveal. For example, in 1997, when the Colombian
Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the U'wa regarding a complaint
that they brought and, thereby, ordered the State to undertake prior
consultation before authorizing seismic exploration in indigenous
territory,112 the U'wa surprised their allies who were celebrating this
"legal victory" by issuing a communiqu6 expressing their rejection of the
Court's ruling and reiterating that their goal was not that the oil project
be consulted or negotiated, but rather that it simply be cancelled for
attacking their most profound cultural convictions. As the circulated
communiqu6 stated, "we do not understand why they summon us to
participate in a hearing when they know what we will say, which is the
same as what we have been saying from the beginning."" 8
A second reason behind the constant misunderstandings is the very
effect of displacement analyzed earlier. The displacement of substance
by form is partial and temporary. Disagreements regarding the actual
merits resurface at every turn during the consultation process, and the
procedural language available is insufficient for expressing them. Thus,
110. For a detailed analysis of the U'wa case, see C~sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito & Luis
Carlos Arenas, Indigenous Rights, Transnational Activism, and Legal Mobilization: The
Struggle of the U'wa People in Colombia, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROm BELOW, supra
note 34, at 241.
111. Carta de los U'wa al Hombre Blanco, U'WA COMMUNIQU, (U'wa, Colom.), Sept. 5,
2008, available at http://www.maippa.org/CampaC3%Bla-U-Wa-Colombialcarta-de-losuwa-al-hombre-blanco.html (author's translation).
112. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] (Constitutional Court], febrero 3, 1997, Sentencia SU039/97.

113. Comunicado a la Opini6n Pdblica, U'WA COMMUNIQUt, (U'wa, Colom.), Feb. 10,
1997 (author's translation).
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in many cases, references to procedure (e.g., to the deadlines, timelines,
and agreements reached in meetings) are just indirect ways of
discussing what is really at stake. As one leader of the Kankuamo
people of Colombia, a lawyer with ONIC, stated, "the real subject of
consultation is life":114 the life of the people involved; the physical
survival of its members; the extractive companies' survival in the
market, the biodiversity at stake; and the plans for life and death
executed by the illegal, armed groups that swarm the minefields.
As a consequence, the consultation meetings mix extremely varied
topics, and their agendas are debated constantly. While state officials
and company representatives seek to limit discussion to immediate
procedural topics (e.g., operationalizing agreements, certifying the list of
participants, and navigating the intricacies of compensation payments),
the indigenous representatives, as we observed in the U'wa case,
constantly return to the subjects of the sacredness of the earth and its
resources and the collective history and denouncement of the violence
that engulfs them. It is, therefore, unsurprising that delays are
recurrent and miscommunication is endemic.
Not all misunderstandings are involuntary, however. Companies,
state agencies, and indigenous peoples strategically use the laws,
judicial decisions, and legal recourses available to them and invoke
procedural rules to defend their substantive interests. To do this, the
first two groups employ an army of professional advisors (e.g., lawyers,
anthropologists, engineers, and social workers). The indigenous peoples
and their allies, however, take advantage of opportunities offered by
national courts' stricter interpretations of consultation's requisites and
mobilize the support of international bodies, like the ILO and the U.N.
Rapporteurship on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In the Urrd case,
for example, during the first phase of the dam's construction, the
Embera were at the mercy of the state and the company, who simply
failed to consult the Embera. But, following the 1998 Constitutional
Court's decision, the Embera had incorporated legal strategies
exploiting international and domestic norms on consultation into their
political battle and their organizational alliances, in order to revive
their substantive claims. It is the use of these norms that has allowed
them to keep the plans for the dam's expansion at bay, which legal
obstacles have blocked during this past decade. In this case as in others,
the battle over applying and interpreting procedural norms has become
an extension of a political struggle-the struggle for territory, selfdetermination, and resources.

114. Interview with Ana Manuela Ochoa, in BogotA, Colom. (Nov. 18, 2009).
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C. The Domination Effect
Contrary to the (neo)liberal premise of equality between parties, the
legal battle is actually highly asymmetric. In fact, the experience of
consultation illustrates the governance paradigm's limitations
mentioned earlier, which escalate in the context of minefields cohabited
by actors endowed with abysmally different degrees of power. Instead of
the ideal conditions for communication postulated by governance
theorists, the reality of consultation usually resembles a private act of
negotiation more than a public act of deliberation. As in all contractual
acts, it reproduces and legitimates structural power differences among
the parties. In this regard, consultation reinforces the dominant
relations among companies, states, and indigenous peoples.
The domination effect has several manifestations. To begin with,
consultation processes tend to be privatized operations. De facto, if not
de jure, the company interested in executing operations in indigenous
territory administers, funds, and controls the consultation process. On
more than one occasion, I have traveled to consultation sites on
transportation chartered by the company, accompanied not only by the
latter's representatives, but also by public officials who are required to
attend the consultation, and who have neither the funds nor the means
to arrive at such isolated places (where, moreover, they have never
visited before). Within the enclave economies where many consultations
occur, the company, for practical purposes, is the state: access to the
locale depends on the company, local authorities coordinate and interact
with the company, and a large sector of the population is subordinated
to it, either through labor relations or indirect economic dependence.
The domination effect also has a violent face in contexts of armed
conflict, in which the company's operations depend in some way or
another on protection provided by legal or illegal armed groups. In Urri,
for example, the company had the enthusiastic support of right-wing
paramilitary groups, who considered the dam to be essential for the
interests of the large landowners they represented. The situation was
captured in an article written by Bernard Henry-Levy, 115 who traveled
to the region in 2001 and interviewed Carlos Castafio, commander of the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, who was later assassinated by
his subordinates. When the French philosopher reminded Castaflo of
the indiscriminate executions committed by his paramilitary death
squads, the following exchange ensued:

115. Bernard Henry-Levy, Guerra Contra los Inocentes, REVISTA SEMANA, July 9, 2001,
http://www.semana.com/noticias-opinion/guerra-contra-inocentes/17869.aspx
(author's
translation).
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Castaflo: Random attacks? Us? Never! There is always a
reason. The trade unionists, for example. They prevent
people from working! That is why we kill them.
Henry-Levy: Okay, and the leader of the indigenous
people in the Upper Sinii-that small Indian leader that
came down to Tierralata [the closest town]-who was he
preventing from working?
Castafio: The dam! He was blocking the operation of the
dam!116

Violence and intimidation against leaders are common in many of
the cases I have observed. One frequent practice in Colombia, for
example, consists of the following: the illegal, armed groups interested
in the company's entry intimidate and perpetrate violence against
representatives of the community to be consulted, provoking their forced
displacement from the territory. Thus, when consultation occurs, it is
carried out with members of the community who have stayed behind, in
extremely coercive conditions that do not even reach those of a private
negotiation. As one leader from ONIC said in an interview in reference
to this practice, "There is no negotiation when you have a gun to your
head.""1
Even where there is no physical coercion involved, the relations of
domination among the parties are present due to the profound economic
inequalities that consultation leaves intact. In UrrA, as in other places,
extreme conditions of poverty and the indigenous people's social
disintegration-which, as explained, border on ethnocide-do not allow
for free and informed participation in the consultation process, let alone
genuine consent. Although these power asymmetries are mitigated
when international and national activist coalitions intervene in support
of indigenous peoples, they continue to be endemic, even in cases such
as Urrd, where the indigenous cause has gained national and
international visibility.
The power asymmetry between company and community is
exacerbated by the fact that, as legislation and practice in the Latin
American countries under study demonstrate, the state acts as official
witness of the consultation process, more than as its regulator or
guarantor. In this regard, the state apparatus rarely mitigates, or even
mediates, the company's dominance over the community. As a former

116. Id.
117. Interview with ONIC leader, in Valledupar, Colom. (June 15, 2010).
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official of the Colombian Ministry of Environment, who participated in
consultation processes for a number of years, told us, "the State's
accompaniment is minimal, a matter of protocol. In many cases, secondhand
information submitted by the company serves as the basis . . . . [For

example], environmental impact studies are conducted by anthropologists
paid by the companies."" 8 Or, as the official who directs the
governmental entity in charge of consultations at the national level
candidly recognized, "We coordinate, we summon the parties, we
mediate, we direct the meetings. But it is the entity that consults, [the
company], that must offer the logistical support necessary for convening
the community. We do not do this part. The party who consults does
it."119 The party who consults is the company. The consulted is the

indigenous community. And, the state stamps its official seal on
whatever agreement is produced.
Beyond the physical or economic coercion, the effect of domination
operates by more subtle and indirect means. Mere participation in
consultation processes or in litigation related to them places the
indigenous cause within the logic of procedure, which has costs, as it
limits what can be said, demanded, and achieved. Although the
substantive claims reappear during the course of negotiations and
judicial proceedings, in order for them to be effective, they must be
articulated within the limits of language and the international and
domestic procedural norms related to FPIC. The result is dissolution, at
least in part, of politics into law: the conversion of strong political claims
(i.e., related to self-determination and consent) into weaker claims (i.e.,
related to participation and consultation's requisites). Along the way,
indigenous political subjectivity is transformed. In place of the
contentious subject of indigenous movements, consultation demands a
docile, communicative subject.
This domestication of indigenous demands can operate even in cases
in which the right to consultation is successfully defended before
governments, courts, and international human rights bodies, as Hale
concludes1 20 after analyzing the consequences of the Mayagna
indigenous people's legal victory in the foundational Inter-American
Court of Human Rights case, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.121 For the
Mayagna, the price paid for several years of involvement in proceedings
118. Interview with former official in the Colombia Ministry of Environment, in BogotA,
Colom. (Oct. 17, 2009).
119. Interview with Claudia CAceres, Director of the Prior Consultation Unit, Colom.
Ministry of the Interior, in BogotA, Colom. (Nov. 16, 2009).
120. Hale, supra note 61, at 15-16.
121. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
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and negotiations with the state, the World Bank, and other actors that
participated in the demarcation of indigenous territory ordered by the
Court was "a deeper entanglement in . . . neoliberalisms'

'grid of

intelligibility,"' 122 which entailed "an unprecedented involvement of the
state and of neoliberal development institutions in the community's
internal affairs: regulating the details of the claim, shaping political
subjectivities, and reconfiguring internal relations."123 Indigenous
peoples involved in consultation processes must pay this same price, as
the Urri case illustrates. After the successful legal case brought before
the Constitutional Court, the collective and individual lives of the
Embera have stayed trapped by-in fact, have become defined byneoliberalism's grid of intelligibility: in the company's monthly payouts
upon which the Embera now depend, in the political division among
communities that formed opposing sides during the consultation
process, and in the proliferation of new cases presented before national
courts and the Inter-American System of Human Rights to confront
continuing problems-exacerbated by the dam's constructionregarding security, food, and other basic necessities.
The allusion to the UrrA case's legacy leads us to the last
incarnation of the dominance effect, which operates not only between
companies and indigenous communities, but also between communities
and their allies in consultations. As it often occurs in processes of legal
mobilization,124 the risk of shifting the cause of a social movement to the
domain of the law is the transfer of power from the movement's subjects
(e.g., indigenous peoples involved in the consultation) to their legal
advisers (e.g., NGOs and international bodies that deal with indigenous
rights). As we will now see, this displacement also has an emancipatory
effect to the extent that it helps mitigate the power disparities between
companies and communities. However, its existence is undeniable, as
we observed when the aforementioned Embera leader concluded an
hourlong presentation of detailed legal arguments effused over
elaborate PowerPoint slides. "At the end of the day," he said to us as he
took a seat, "you tell us what to do, because I am only an Indian and
don't know about these things."

D. The EmancipationEffect
The reverse of the domination effect consists in the emancipatory
possibilities presented by consultation processes. In practice,
122. Hale, supra note 61, at 15.
123. Id. at 16.
124. MICHAEL W. McCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
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consultation is simultaneously a means to both perpetuate and
challenge profound inequalities among actors situated in minefields.
While they dilute indigenous political demands, procedural norms also
create precious opportunities and tools-sometimes the only ones
available-for halting (or at least postponing) irreversible cultural and
environmental harm and founding or refounding processes of collective
mobilization.
The ethnographic evidence demonstrates that consultation's
emancipatory effect can be direct or indirect. The effect is direct when
subaltern actors-indigenous communities and their allies-demand
compliance with procedural norms and propose interpretations of them
that mitigate power asymmetries vis-A-vis consultation's dominant
actors. The process itself has emancipatory potential, to the extent that
it establishes strict requirements that reduce the gap between the
conditions of actual consultations, on the one hand, and those necessary
for genuine deliberation, on the other.
As we saw earlier, procedural regulations are not irrelevant. Once
they are put into operation, they make a difference that can be a literal
difference between life and death. For example, an indigenous people's
survival can depend on the possibility that not only do their members
have standing to participate in consultation, but so do allied national
indigenous organizations who-due to their legal expertise or
experience in other consultations-can help balance out power relations.
As the U.N. Rapporteurship and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights have recognized, whether the standard of consultation or the
standard of consent is applied can determine the fate of an indigenous
people affected by a large-scale economic project. The Embera of
northern Colombia have experienced this difference between life and
death literally.
As such, many of the consultation proceedings consist of debates
about whether or not there has been compliance with requisites
established by national legislation, Convention 169, and other legal
instruments. Were affected communities notified in a timely manner
and in good faith? Were those who attended the proceedings the true
legal representatives of the indigenous people? Who should pay for the
costs of translation between Spanish and the indigenous language?
Should the timeline of meetings be extended in order to attain increased
attendance? Who is responsible for financing the transportation costs of
the members coming in from the most remotely located communities?
Each one of these questions starts a justiciable controversy that can
slow the frenetic pace of economic projects in indigenous territories and
can be, in practice, the only defense against the flooding of indigenous
reservations, such as the Embera's, or against the incursion of
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engineering crews, settlers, and armed groups in oil-rich territories,
such as the U'wa's.
The emancipatory effect also operates through indirect means, far
from the formal consultation meetings. In societies such as those of
Latin America, where the wave of multicultural constitutionalism of the
1990s arrived precisely when indigenous peoples were experiencing both
organizational revitalization and collective extermination, the norms
enshrined in Convention 169 and other legal instruments opened
additional paths of resistance and political mobilization. In these
circumstances, consultation has been embraced as an instrument for
slowing the avalanche of mining and other extractive projects engulfing
indigenous communities situated in economies bent on the exploitation
of natural resources. This explains why, as I have observed, in countries
like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and Guatemala, cases and
technical legal discussions about FPIC occupy a privileged position in
the agendas of national indigenous organizations. 1 25 As a result, at the
national level, FPIC has become a useful card that indigenous
movements can play in negotiations and litigation before states and
companies. The card's effectiveness is demonstrated by the multiple
laws that regulate matters of vital importance for companies and
indigenous peoples in those countries, such as the use of forests or the
exploitation of hydrocarbons, 126 which have been subsequently struck
down by national courts for violating Convention 169.
At the transnational level, FPIC has also opened new avenues for
counterhegemonic legal mobilization. In the Americas, for example, it
has allowed indigenous organizations and human rights NGOs to
stretch Inter-American law's interpretation to create hybrid versions
that combine standards of consultation and consent. At the global level,
it has offered a unique forum for collaboration between the labor union
movement and the indigenous movement, in light of the multiple
occasions in which the former, on behalf of the latter, has presented the
latter's complaints alleging violations of Convention 169 to the ILO, as
in the cases of the Urri dam and oil exploration in the U'wa's territory.
In this regard, on the ground, procedural rules related to
consultation may create space for advancing empowered versions of

125. Andrade interview, supra note 71; de la Rosa interview, supra note 71.
126. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 23, 2008,
Sentencia C-030/2008 (Colom.) (declaring unconstitutional the National Forestry Statute
due to the omission of prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 18, 2009,
Sentencia C-175/2009 (Colom.) (declaring unconstitutional the National Rural
Development Statute for the same reason).
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participation 27 that borrow elements from counterhegemonic
multiculturalism and, in some cases, revitalize the process of
reinventing collective identity and strengthening political organization
in the face of negotiations with companies and the state, as it did in the
U'wa case. 128
CONCLUSION
With the benefit of hindsight, law's omnipresence and the frequent
allusions to "prior consultation" during the meeting in UrrA, mentioned
at the beginning of this article, turn out to be less surprising than they
were that night in the Embera reservation. Similar incidents combining
extreme violence and the most sophisticated legal formalism proliferate
in minefields where the fates of indigenous peoples in Latin America
and around the world are decided.
In this article, I have tried to explain the reasons behind this
phenomenon. I have argued that FPIC's ascendancy and global diffusion
form part of a process comprised of the global juridification of
difference-a process that I have termed ethnicity.gov-which reflects
the dominant type of multiculturalism and governance that dominates
in the era of neoliberal globalization. Ethnicity.gov's procedural logic
permits communication between substantively distinct positions, which
are defended by opposing parties to conflicts over culture and
distribution that proliferate in both the Global South and the Global
North.
In the specific area of indigenous rights, after twenty years of
existence, FPIC has become a central mechanism by which a range of
legal regimes (e.g., ILO and U.N. human rights instruments,
multilateral banks and TNCs' codes of conduct, and national
constitutions) have sought to manage disputes over indigenous
territories, natural resources, identity, and self-determination. Drawing
on the premises of the governance paradigm, FPIC has replaced
integrationism as the dominant regulatory approach regarding
indigenous peoples.
I have also sought to show that ethnicity.gov, in general, and FPIC,
in particular, are contested legal fields in which counter-hegemonic
conceptions of multiculturalism and indigenous rights dispute the
127. For a discussion of empowered participation and its contrast with token
consultation, see Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, CountervailingPower in Empowered
Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 259 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds.,
2003).

128. See Rodriguez-Garavito & Arenas, supra note 110, at 249-64.

ETHNICITY.GOV

305

supremacy of neoliberal multiculturalism and governance. Based on
principles of self-determination and the figure of free, prior, and
informed consent, these conceptions have been advanced by the
transnational indigenous movement and its allies.
In addition, I have traced this contested figure's origin, evolution,
and effects on two different levels. First, I focused on FPIC's regulation,
as a product of the ILO Convention 169, the national constitutions that
took the "multicultural turn" in the 1990s, the transnational soft law
norms, the decisions of human rights courts and bodies, and, most
recently, the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Based on this analysis, I demonstrated the existence of multiple hybrid
formulae that embody substantially different forms of indigenous
of
the feigned participation characteristic
participation-from
consultations carried out without stringent procedural requisites and
effective monitoring to the empowered participation with genuine
decision-making power associated with regulations that have adopted
some version of the consent requirement.
Second, I examined consultation's operation and effects in practice.
When put to the test in contexts that are radically different than the
negotiations imagined by governance theorists and international
regulators, FPIC's procedural norms yield unexpected and ambiguous
results. On the one hand, they dilute indigenous political claims into
procedural discussions that are dominated by companies, with limited
state mediation. However, the displacement of substantive disputes by
procedural ones is both incomplete and imperfect. As a result,
differences regarding the merits reappear constantly, thereby combining
substance and form and leading to frequent miscommunication during
negotiations-some of which are unintended, while others are deliberate
and caused by companies, indigenous communities, and state officials
seeking to strategically exploit the confusion.
Given the abysmal disparities in power and resources between the
actors involved, it is unsurprising that FPIC's procedural rules
constantly reinforce and legitimate the relations of domination among
them. Yet consultations have served as a forum for resisting these
relations. The details pertaining to procedural norms (e.g., who will
participate, how long will the consultation last, and what type of
compensation should be accorded) can open opportunities for indigenous
political mobilization. They may offer a last recourse-a last
inconvenience in the way of death-to which indigenous peoples cling in
the face of all odds, as the Colombian Embera communities continue to
do in their struggle against collective annihilation.

